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International Legal Action Against Apartheid
Professor David Weissbrodt*
and Georgina Mahoney**
Apartheid in Southern Africa represents one of the greatest
challenges, one of the greatest success stories, and one of the most
frustrating defeats of the international human rights movement.
This article first introduces international human rights and the international law of human rights-particularly as they relate to
apartheid. Second, the article sketches the work of the International Court of Justice, which has rendered three significant
human rights decisions concerning Namibia. Having begun to discuss Namibia, the article also examines the work of the Security
Council, General Assembly, and other United Nations bodies concerning Namibia.
Third, having discussed Namibia, it is logical to consider the
other geographical areas where there have been significant and
successful international action against apartheid in the southern
African region: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Fourth, the article reviews
international legal action in regard to South Africa itself. The
presentation on South Africa has been organized around the institutions which have helped to establish the international legal consensus that apartheid is a criminal offense against humanity.
Accordingly, this fourth section starts with treaties, then moves on
to the Security Council, the General Assembly, other United Nations bodies, and finally a brief view of United States court
activity.
I. Human Rights and the International Law of Human Rights
One can trace the origins of the international human rights
movement back to the nineteenth century efforts to abolish slavery' and to the formation of the Red Cross to give relief to the
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. This brief article was initially
presented as introductory remarks for a program on October 11, 1985, entitled
"Apartheid and American Lawyers" sponsored by the Minnesota Minority Lawyers
Association. The author wishes to express his gratitude to Theodore J. May for his
help in preparing this article.
** University of Minnesota Law School, class of 1986.
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wounded and prisoners of war.2 One can even look back to declarations such as the United States Bill of Rights in the eighteenth
century. 3 Nevertheless, most observers point to the formation of
the United Nations as the beginning of the modern struggle to implement international human rights.4 Since then, as Harlan Cleveland of the University of Minnesota Humphrey Institute has
pointed out, international human rights has become the world's
first universal ideology.5 Religions, political philosophies, and economic ideas have adherents in various parts of the world, but
human rights represents an idea which now has worldwide
acceptance.
In joining the United Nations, every government undertook
to promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion." 6 The prominence of the prohibition
against racial discrimination is noteworthy in this seminal provi7
sion of the U.N. Charter.
Soon after the formation of the United Nations forty years
ago, a group of delegates headed by Eleanor Roosevelt sought to
clarify this international obligation by promulgating the Universal
(1977) (on file with Law & Inequality); Shridath Ramphal, 'Some in Light and
Some in Darkness': The Long Shadow of Slavery (1983).
2. See David Forsythe, Humanitarian Politics: The International Committee of
the Red Cross (1977); Richard Perruchoud, Les Resolutions des Conferences Internationales de la Croix-Rouge (1979).
3. See Louis Henkin, InternationalHuman Rights and Rights in the United
States, in Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues 25, 27-31
(Theodor Meron ed. 1984) [hereinafter Meron]; Louis Henkin, ConstitutionalFathers-ConstitutionalSons, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 1113, 1114-15 (1976).
4. See Richard Bilder, The Status of InternationalHuman Rights Law: An
Overview, in International Human Rights Law and Practice 1, 1 (James Tuttle ed.
1978) [hereinafter International Human Rights].
5. See Reconciling Human Rights and U.S. Security Interests in Asia: Hearings Before the Subcomms. on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on Human Rights
and International Organizations of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 485, 492 (1982) (statement of Harlan Cleveland, Director of the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota).
6. U.N. Charter art. 55.
7. See Jack Greenberg, Race, Sex, and Religious Discrimination in International Law, in Meron, supra note 3, at 307, 309; Karl Partsch, FundamentalPrinciples of Human Rights: Self-Determination,Equality and Non-Discrimination,in 1
The International Dimensions of Human Rights 61, 70, 73, 75-81 (Karel Vasak ed.
1982). The drafters of this provision listed racial discrimination first and found discrimination such a significant violation of human rights that it deserved proscription in the UN Charter itself. See Warwick McKean, Equality and Discrimination
Under International Law 54-55 (1983); see also Marc Bossuyt, L'Interdiction de la
Discrimination dans le Droit International des Droits de l'Homme 12-13 (1976).
The prominence of this prohibition against racial discrimination is, of course, very
relevant to the situation in South Africa.
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Declaration of Human Rights.8 The Declaration represents the
most authoritative definition of human rights in existence: it has
found its way into many national constitutions 9 and parts have become recognized as international customary law.' 0 Article one of
the Declaration states: "All human beings are born free and equal
in dignity and rights." 1 Article two states: "Everyone is entitled to
all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration without
distinctions of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, etc ....,,12 Again, the issue of racial discrimination is given
prominence.
In addition to the Charter and the Universal Declaration, the
United Nations and other bodies have proceeded to develop further international standards in the area of human rights-more
than exist in any other area of international law.
Those lawyers schooled principally in the United States
might object: "What good are these international standards if there
is no way to enforce them? We do not have an international police
force or army." The answer to this question is that international
human rights can be achieved through the techniques of advocacy,
persuasion, threats of public exposure, embarrassment, and
ultimately, political and economic isolation of the violator.
Although these techniques are not commonly used in the United
States legal system, where courts have power to punish and enjoin,
these international human rights techniques can be effective.
Thanks to these techniques, some death sentences are voided,1
some "disappeared" persons re-appear,' 4 some persons receive
8. Universal Declarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/
810, at 71 (1948), reprinted in Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments at 1, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/i/Rev.2, U.N. Sales No. E.83.XIV.1 (1983) [hereinafter Human Rights Compilation].
9. Egon Schwelb, Human Rights and the International Community 50-55
(1964); Egon Schwelb, The Influence of the UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights
on Internationaland National Law, 53 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 217, 223-26 (1959).
10. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
11. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 8, at 72, in Human
Rights Compilation, supra note 8, at 1.
12. Id.
13. Question of the Violation of Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms in
Any Part of the World, with ParticularReference to Colonial and Other Dependent

Countries and Territories: Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. S. Amos Wako,
40 U.N. ESCOR (Agenda Item 12) at 9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/29 (1984) (Guatemala suspended the death sentences imposed by courts of special jurisdiction).
14. See Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment, in Particular:Question of Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearance:Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disap-

pearances, 42 U.N. ESCOR (Agenda Item 10(c)) at 105-06, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/
18 (prov. ed. 1986).
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fairer trialsiS or escape torture,1 6 and some oppressive governments fall.

II.

17

Actions Against Apartheid: The International Court
of Justice and Namibia

It seems best to begin with the International Court of Justice
(I.C.J.), or World Court, not only because the Court has received
considerable media attention, but also because the Court does its
work through the adversarial model which United States lawyers
know better than other international procedures.18 The I.C.J. cooperates with other UN bodies in settling a variety of legal questions, including many human rights issues. In fact, several human
rights treaties expressly confer jurisdiction on the I.C.J.19
The International Court of Justice decided several significant
cases involving the former German colony of South West Africa,
15. See David Weissbrodt, InternationalTrial Observers, 18 Stan. J. Int'l L. 27,
112-14 (1982).
16. Amnesty International, Torture in the Eighties 27-76 (1984).
17. With regard to all aspects of human rights implementation, it is particularly
difficult to demonstrate the causal connection between efforts and actual improvements. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that countries such as Uruguay have credited
international human rights pressure with helping to establish new governments
which are more respectful of human rights norms. See David Weissbrodt, Report
on the Forty-FirstSession of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, AIUSA Legal
Support Network Newsl., Mar. 1985, at 8, 13-14.
18. The International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) is the successor to the Permanent Court of International Justice (P.C.I.J.), established in 1921 by the Assembly
of the League of Nations. With the advent of the United Nations, the I.C.J. took
over the functions of the P.C.I.J. See U.N. Charter art. 92. The I.C.J. possesses four
types of jurisdiction: (1) advisory jurisdiction to consider issues where the views of
the Court are requested by the General Assembly, Security Council, or other U.N.
bodies. See U.N. Charter art. 96; (2) contentious jurisdiction whereby the parties to
an international legal dispute bring a matter to the Court by compromis or specific
agreement. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, para. 1; (3) contentious jurisdiction whereby a party to an international convention brings a dispute
against another party to that treaty which provides for references of matters to the
I.C.J. Id.; and (4) contentious jurisdiction whereby a state which has accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court brings a case against another country which
has accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. Id. at para. 2. See also Shabtai
Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 292-331, 364-421, 698-757
(1975). The Court has recently received public attention because the United States
has recently withdrawn its acceptance of the I.C.J.'s compulsory jurisdiction. See
United States: Department of State Letter and Statement Concerning Termination
of Acceptance of I.CJ. Compulsory Jurisdiction, 24 Int'l Legal Materials 1742
(1985).
19. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, approved and proposedfor signature Dec. 9, 1948, art. XI, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
(entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide], reprinted in Human
Rights Compilation, supra note 8, at 56; see also Highlights of Forty Years of
United Nations Efforts on Behalf of Colonial Countriesand Peoples, Objective: Justice, June 1985, at 11-12 [hereinafter Highlights of Efforts].
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which is now known as Namibia. The first case arose from a request in 1949 by the General Assembly 20 of the United Nations for
an advisory opinion as to the legal status of the territory of South
West Africa. 2 ' The case dealt with the League of Nation's 1920 decision to give South Africa an international mandate to administer
South West Africa.22 After the formation of the United Nations
and the dissolution of the League of Nations, the U.N. General Assembly invited states administering territories under the League of
Nations mandates23 to submit trusteeship agreements for the General Assembly's approval.24 South Africa asked the General Assembly if it could take this land and make it part of South
Africa.25 The General Assembly refused and requested that South
West Africa be placed under the international trusteeship system. 26 In response, South Africa refused to comply with the reporting requirements of the trusteeship system, whose goal is to
end colonialism and allow new nations to achieve independence.27
In 1949, the General Assembly asked the I.C.J. to render an
advisory opinion on the status of South West Africa and on the ob20. G.A. Res. 338 (IV), U.N. Doc. A/1251, at 45 (1949). The General Assembly
consists of representatives from all the member states of the United Nations. U.N.
Charter art. 9, para. 1. The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, receive reports and generally supervise the administration of trust
territories with a view to "progressive development towards self-government or independence." U.N. Charter arts. 16, 76, 87.
21. International Status of South West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128 (Advisory Opinion
of July 11).
22. Id.
23. Under the League of Nations mandate, South Africa undertook to "promote
to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants" of South-West Africa. Id. at 133. See generally Louis Sohn & Thomas
Buergenthal, International Protection of Human Rights 337-504 (1973).
24. G.A. Res. XI (I), U.N. Doc. A/64, at 13 (1946). The trusteeship agreements
would comply with the provisions of article 76 of the United Nations Charter, including such objectives as "to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive
development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to
the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of
each trusteeship agreement." U.N. Charter art. 76(b). Trusteeship agreements
would also "encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world." U.N. Charter art. 76(c).
25. South Africa was probably motivated by the many natural resources including copper, diamonds, lead, lithium, silver, and zinc, which are found in Namibia.
See US. Interests in Africa" Hearings before the Subcomm. on Africa of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 2 at 504 (1980) [hereinafter
Africa Hearings].
26. G.A. Res. 65 (I), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 123-24 (1946).
27. See Sohn & Buergenthal, supra note 23, at 374.

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 4:485

ligations of South Africa in regard to the territory.28 The following year, the I.C.J. decided that South Africa's obligations under
the mandate were still in force and that the General Assembly was
competent to discharge the supervisory functions previously exer29
cised by the League of Nations.
South Africa refused to submit to UN supervision in its administration of South West Africa. It continued to practice
apartheid in the region. Ethiopia and Liberia instituted proceedings in the I.C.J. against South Africa for its failure to fulfill its
obligations under the mandate it had received from the League of
Nations and assumed by the United Nations.3 0 This time the
World Court found that the League of Nations Covenant had made
no provision for state versus state actions. 31 Hence, Ethiopia and
Liberia were held to have no standing.
The ensuing world outcry against the World Court's unpopular decision had a very negative effect upon its stature.3 2 Since
Ethiopia and Liberia lacked standing, the General Assembly asked
the I.C.J. for an advisory opinion on the status of Namibia.3 3 This
time, in 1971, the I.C.J. declared South Africa's presence in
Namibia to be illegal. 3 4 The court affirmed that distinctions based
on race violate the UN Charter and that all member states of the
UN had an obligation to refrain from supporting South Africa's illegal presence in Namibia. 35 Since the time of that historic decision, the World Court's decision has been cited for the proposition
that the Charter imposes obligations on the member states to support human rights. 36 Indeed, as one reviews the history of the in28. International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 129 (Advisory
Opinion of July 11).

29. Id. at 143-45.
30. South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) 1966
I.C.J. 5 (Judgment of July 18); cf. U.N. Charter art. 77 (trusteeship system applies
to territories under mandate).
31. South West Africa, 1966 I.C.J. at 29-33.
32. See Bin Cheng, The 1966 South West Africa Judgment of the World Court,
20 Current Legal Probs. 181 (1967). The decision caused violence in northern
Namibia. John Dugard, South West Africa and the "Terrorist Tria4" 64 Am. J.
Int'l L. 19, 21 (1970).
33. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276

(1970), 1971 I.C.J. 15 (Advisory Opinion of June 21).
34. Id. at 46.
35. Id. at 45, 46.
36. Id. at 57. See, e.g., Egon Schwelb, The International Court of Justice and
the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter,66 Am. J. Int'l L. 337 (1972); Richard Lillich & Frank Newman, International Human Rights: Problems of Law and Policy
33-34 (1979); Richard Lillich, The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing International Human Rights Law, in Guide to International Human Rights Practice 223,
227-28, 241 (Hurst Hannum ed. 1984); 1974 Digest of the United States Practice in
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ternational legal activity against apartheid,one is struck not only
by the diversity of efforts but also by the way the case of South
Africa has been used to develop very important international
human rights law precedents which have been helpful with re37
spect to countries in all parts of the world.
Even before the I.C.J. decision in 1971, the United Nations
General Assembly in 1966 had terminated South Africa's mandate
over South West Africa on the ground that South Africa had already disavowed the mandate by failing to fulfill its obligations
thereunder. 38 The General Assembly decided that henceforth the
territory would come under the direct supervision of the United
Nations. Pursuant to Resolution 2248,39 the UN established the
Council for Namibia as the legal authority administering Namibia.
The General Assembly proclaimed that, in accordance with the
wishes of its people, South West Africa would henceforth be
known as Namibia. The General Assembly then integrated under
one trust fund-the UN Educational and Training Program for
Southern Africa-the assistance funds for Namibia, South Africa,
40
Rhodesia, and the Portuguese territories of southern Africa.
For the first six months, the Council for Namibia tried to operate in Namibia and work toward a smooth transition of governments. The Council soon decided, however, that the South African
authorities simply were not going to cooperate. 4 1 Hence, since
1967, the Council has essentially been working as a government in
exile, with one office in New York City and another in Lusaka,
Zambia.
In 1969, the Security Council condemned South Africa for its
defiance of the authority of the United Nations. 42 The Council
recognized the legitimacy of the struggle of the Namibian people
against the illegal presence of the South African authorities. The
International Law 125 (quoting address by George H. Aldrich, Acting Legal Advisor
of the Department of State).
37. See John Carey, United Nations' Double Standard on Human Rights Complaints, 60 Am. J. Int'l L. 792 (1966); Howard Tolley, The Concealed Crack in the
CitadeL. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights' Response to Confidential Communications, 6 Hum. Rts. Q. 420, 442, 446 (1984).
38. Highlights of Efforts, supra note 19, at 21.
39. G.A. Res. 2248 (S-V), 5 U.N. GAOR Special Session Supp. (No. 1) at 1, U.N.
Doc. A/6657 (1967). See also G.A. Res. 2145 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at
2, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
40. Highlights of Efforts, supra note 19, at 22.
41. Id. The South African government has resisted the efforts of the United
Nations to achieve independence for Namibia and to end the illegal South African
occupation of that territory. Report of the United Nations Councilfor Namibia, 39
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 24) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/39/24 (Part I) (1984).
42. Highlights of Efforts, supra note 19, at 22-23.
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Council requested member states to lend moral and material
43
assistance to the armed struggle of the Namibian people.
In 1974, the Council for Namibia enacted the Decree on the
Natural Resources of Namibia.44 Under the decree, no person, corporation, or entity may search for, take, or distribute any natural
resource, animal or mineral, found in Namibia. Any vehicle, ship,
or container found to be transporting such resources is subject to
seizure. Any person or entity violating the decree may be held liable for damages by the future government of an independent
45
Namibia.
In 1976, the Council for Namibia established the Institute for
Namibia.46 The purpose of the Institute is to provide Namibians
with education and training to help them in the struggle for independence and to administer the government once independence is
won. The Institute is also located in Lusaka "until South Africa's
7
illegal occupation of Namibia is terminated."4
Between 1976 and 1978, the General Assembly and the Security Council drew up a program of action for Namibia's independence. 48 The program demanded free elections in Namibia, as well
as universal suffrage. South Africa, however, proceeded with its
own unilateral elections, the results of which were declared null
49
and void by the General Assembly.
The United States has taken the position that South Africa illegally occupies Namibia. The United States filed a brief in the International Court of Justice arguing that South Africa possessed
no right to continue its occupation of Namibia.50 Nevertheless, the
present United States Administration has introduced a new, rather
extraneous, issue into the effort to achieve Namibian independence. The United States now contends that Cuban military advisors must depart from Angola before there can be independence
for Namibia. In 1983, the General Assembly rejected these at43. Id.
44. Decree on the Natural Resources of Namibia, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
24A) at 27-28, U.N. Doc. A/9624/Add. 1 (1974). See also G.A. Res. 3295 (XXIX), 29
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 106, 107, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
45. Id. This decree was probably intended not only to declare that South African mining and similar operations in Namibia were illegal, but also to discourage
companies from exploiting or trading in these Namibian raw materials.

46.
47.
48.
49.

Highlights of Efforts, supra note 19, at 32.
Id. at 28-29.
Id. at 33-36.
Id. at 36.

50. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in

Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), 1971 I.C.J. Pleadings vol. I at 843, 874 (Advisory Opinion of June 21) (Written Statement of the Government of the United States).
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tempts to condition Namibia's independence on such extraneous issues. 51 South Africa, however, has grasped at this single issue to
excuse its continued presence in Namibia. Nevertheless, UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar has indicated his willingness
to go forward with the United Nations Plan for Namibian independence "without any preconditions."52
Namibia has not yet gained independence. South Africa has
made it clear that it has no intention of complying with either the
letter or the spirit of the United Nations plan for Namibia.
Namibian independence will be achieved only if the United States
places sufficient political pressure on South Africa or if the South
African government decides, as it did in regard to Rhodesia, that
the defense of its parochial interests requires that it concentrate
limited energies on South Africa alone.
III. Rhodesia/Zimbabwe
Lest one despair over Namibia, it is useful to keep in mind
that international pressures were more successful in ending
apartheid in another country-Southern Rhodesia. There UN
sanctions, together with the pressure of internal armed conflict, finally brought down the racist government of Ian Smith and led to
the formation of Zimbabwe.
The Rhodesia/Zimbabwe case may be the one in which, to
date, sanctions were applied with the widest international support.
Of course, it is difficult to gauge the effect of sanctions with precision. The impact of sanctions must be considered along with other
factors affecting the economy and political strength of the sanctioned government.
In 1965, a white supremacist government in Rhodesia Unilaterally Declared its Independence (U.D.I.) from Britain.53 The
United Kingdom responded by imposing immediate sanctions and
by asking the Security Council to support these sanctions. The following year, through Resolution 216, the Security Council declared
51. G.A. Res. 38/36 (B), 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 47) at 30, U.N. Doc. A/38/47
(1983). At the 1986 session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, a
resolution was adopted which declared "the universal and categorical rejection of
'linkage' advanced by South Africa and her allies between the independence of
Namibia and irrelevant and extraneous issues, such as the presence of Cuban forces
in Angola." Violations of Human Rights in Southern Africa: Report of the Ad Hoc
Working Group of Experts, 42 U.N. ESCOR (Agenda Item 6) at 4, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/1986/L.18 (1986).
52. Secretary-GeneralReady to Implement Namibian Independence Plan, UN
Monthly Chron., Apr. 1986, at 42.
53. Pieter Kuyper, The Implementation of International Sanctions: The
Netherlands and Rhodesia 43 (1978).

Law and Inequality

(Vol. 4:485

U.D.I. to be illegal and a threat to the peace.54 The Security Council then imposed a selective non-mandatory arms embargo.55 This
action was followed by more comprehensive mandatory sanctions
(Resolution 253).56 This resolution, explicitly based on Chapter
VII of the Charter,57 provided for a complete ban on all imports
originating in Rhodesia, as well as imports to and investments in
Rhodesia. Airlines were prohibited from flying there. Security
Council Resolution 277 obligated member states to sever all diplomatic and military ties as well.58
For a while, Rhodesia withstood the sanctions fairly well,
thanks to countries such as South Africa, who did not comply with
sanctions.5 9 In the mid-seventies, however, Rhodesia began to feel
the effects of the world economic recession and the dramatic rise
60
in oil prices.

During the mid-seventies, Rhodesia was increasingly affected
by the war for independence within its own borders. Before it was
61
When genover, the war took 27,000 lives, most of them Blacks.
uine majority rule was achieved in 1980, the consensus was that

the sanctions, despite all their loopholes and violations, had a se62
verely limiting effect on the Rhodesian economy.
IV.

South Africa

Many ask whether the qualified success of international pressure against Rhodesia could be repeated elsewhere-in South Africa. Today, South Africa experiences greater world condemnation
54. S.C. Res. 216, 20 U.N. SCOR (1258th mtg.) at 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/20/Rev.1
(1965).
55. S.C. Res. 217, 20 U.N. SCOR (1265th mtg.) at 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/INF/20/Rev.1
(1965).
56. S.C. Res. 253, 23 U.N. SCOR (1428th mtg.) at 5-7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/Rev.1
(1968). See also S.C. Res. 232, 21 U.N. SCOR (1340th mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/
21/Rev.1 (1966); S.C. Res. 388, 31 U.N. SCOR (1907th mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doc. S/INF/32
(1976).
57. U.N. Charter arts. 39-51.
58. S.C. Res. 277, 25 U.N. SCOR (1535th mtg.) at 5-6, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25 (1970).
See also Margaret Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement 67-79
(1980).
59. Doxey, supra note 58, at 67-79.
60. Id. at 78.
61. David Crary, Whites Prosper Under Black Rule, St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, Oct. 6, 1985, at 11A, col. 1.
62. Robin Renwick, Economic Sanctions 56-58 (1981). See Lillich & Newman,
supra note 36, at 421-58 (1979). The United States, which had adhered to UN sanctions against Rhodesia for six years, violated the embargo in 1972. It did not resume compliance with the Rhodesian sanctions until 1977 when it stopped
importing chrome. See Act of Mar. 18, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-12, 91 Stat. 22; Exec.
Order No. 11,978, 42 Fed. Reg. 15,403 (1977); Student & Young Adult Div., UN
Ass'n of the U.S.A., Rhodesian Chrome 27-30 (rev. ed. 1974).
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for its human rights violations than any other nation. That condemnation is grounded principally upon international treaties and
the decisions of United Nations bodies.
A.

Treaties

Various international treaties have helped to establish the international legal consensus that apartheid is a criminal offense
against humanity. Treaties form an important substantive body of
international law; they directly create obligations for the state parties. Treaties may also create obligations for non-parties if they
become part of customary law, as have several provisions of
human rights treaties. 63 Hence, even though South Africa has not
ratified any of the treaties discussed below except the United Nations Charter, it is affected by the collective actions of states which
have ratified them, and South Africa may have obligations under
such treaties if they are deemed to be part of international customary law.
Most relevant to the subject of this article is the International
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, promulgated by the General Assembly in 1973.64 It
condemns apartheidas a crime against humanity and obliges state
parties to pass laws and other measures against apartheid. It
obliges states to prosecute individuals who practice and promote
apartheid. The treaty's definition of apartheid includes denial of
life and liberty to persons because of their race, creation of ghettos
for members of a particular racial group, and exploitation of the
63. Two criteria are used to determine whether a principle has attained the status of a rule of customary international law. First, there must be evidence of state
practice, e.g., physical acts, claims, national laws, to show that the norm has been
generally adopted by nations. See Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 1974 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 1, 18, 53; Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of
Custom in International Law 87-92 (1971). Second, the state practice should be accompanied by opinio juris or statements that certain conduct is required or forbidden, giving rise to an international legal obligation. See Akehurst, supra, at 31, 53.
Treaties constitute a part of state practice, especially if accompanied by opinio juris
or claims in the treaty or in the traveaux preparatoiresindicating that a treaty provision is a restatement of preexisting customary law. Id. at 53. Indeed, treaties provide the most accessible and authoritative source of customary international law.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties recognizes in article 38 that a treaty
may become "binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law,
recognized as such." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 38, 8 I.L.M. 679, 694 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
64. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime
of Apartheid, opened for signature Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into
force July 18, 1976) [hereinafter Apartheid], reprinted in Human Rights Compilation, supra note 8, at 29. See G.A. Res. 3368 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
30) at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
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labor of members of a particular racial group.6 5 Seventy-seven
governments have ratified the Apartheid Convention. Significantly, the United States has neither signed nor ratified this
treaty, most likely because of United States concern about the possibility that its corporations doing business in South Africa might
be violating the treaty.
More than 120 governments have ratified the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which specifically condemns apartheid.66 In addition, under
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide,6 7 certain acts which constitute apartheidalso constitute the crime of genocide. 68 Similarly, under the Convention on
the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, "inhuman acts resulting from the policy of apartheid" are included as crimes against humanity for
which there can be no statute of limitations.69 Apartheid also involves slavery-like practices and forced labor prohibited by the
7
Slavery Convention 70 and the Forced Labor Convention. 1
65. Apartheid, supra note 64, at 245-46, in Human Rights Compilation, supra
note 8, at 29-30.
66. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, openedfor signature Mar. 7, 1966, art. 3, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 218 (entered
into force Jan. 4, 1969), reprinted in Human Rights Compilation, supra note 8, at
23, 25.
67. Genocide, supra note 19, at 277, in Human Rights Compilation, supra note
8, at 56.
68. The Genocide Convention forbids a number of acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, as such.
These acts include killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group, and deliberately inflicting group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part. Genocide, art.
2, supra note 19, at 280, in Human Rights Compilation, supra note 8, at 56. The
Apartheid Convention forbids "inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other
racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them." Apartheid, art. 2,
supra note 64, at 245, in Human Rights Compilation, supra note 8, at 29-30. The
acts include denial to racial group members the right to life and liberty of person
by murder, infliction of serious bodily or mental harm, arbitrary arrest or illegal
imprisonment, and "deliberate imposition on a racial group or groups of living conditions calculated to cause its or their physical destruction in whole or in part." Id.,
in Human Rights Compilation, supra note 8, at 30.
69. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, adopted Nov. 26, 1968, art. I, 754 U.N.T.S.
73, 75 (entered into force Nov. 11, 1970), reprintedin Human Rights Compilation,
supra note 8, at 57.
70. Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, T.S. No. 778, 60 L.N.T.S.
253 (entered into force Mar. 9, 1927), reprinted in Human Rights Compilation,
supra note 8, at 65.
71. Forced Labor Convention, adopted June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55 (entered
into force May 1, 1932), reprinted in Human Rights Compilation, supra note 8, at
65.
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B.

Other UN Action Against South Africa

1.

The Security Council.

The Security Council, General Assembly, and other UN bodies have taken repeated action against South Africa. 72 The Security Council considered the question of apartheidfor the first time
in 1960, prompted by large-scale killings in South Africa of unarmed and peaceful demonstrators against apartheid. In Resolution 134, the Council called upon South Africa to abandon
apartheid.73 A few years later in 1963, the Security Council called
upon South Africa to stop killing anti-apartheidleaders (Resolution 181)74 and upon member states to observe a non-mandatory
arms embargo. The same year, the Security Council established a
group of experts "to examine methods of resolving the present situation in South Africa through full, peaceful, and orderly application of human rights .

.

. and to consider what part the United

Nations might play in the achievement of that end." 75 Based on
subsequent recommendations by the group of experts, the Security
Council in ensuing resolutions soon strengthened the economic
sanctions. 76 In Resolution 311 (1972), the Security Council expressed its grave concern that the situation in South Africa constituted a breach of the peace. 77 This finding was important because
it established the basis for the UN to take measures against South
Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter, 78 such as imposing a
mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.7 9 No such
mandatory and comprehensive arms embargo has been imposed
because of opposition by the United States, France, and the United
Kingdom.80
72. See generally United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights at 41-46,
201-12, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/2, U.N. Sales No. E.74.XIV.2 (1974).
73. S.C. Res. 134, 15 U.N. SCOR (856th mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doc. S/INF/15/Rev.1
(1960).
74. S.C. Res. 181, 18 U.N. SCOR (1056th mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/18/Rev.1
(1963).
75. See Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organizatio7, 16 June 1963 -15 June 1964, 19 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 22, U.N. Doc.
A/5801 (1964).
76. Id. at 23.
77. S.C. Res. 311, 27 U.N. SCOR (1639th mtg.) at 10, U.N. Doe. S/INF/28 (1972).
78. U.N. Charter ch. VII (Action with Respect to Threats
Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression).

to the Peace,

79. See Ahmed Khalifa, Assistance to Racist Regimes in Southern Africa: Impact on the Enjoyment of Human Rights at 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/383/Rev.2,

U.N. Sales No. E.79.XIV.3 (1979) [hereinafter Assistance]; Special Reports of the
Special Committee against Apartheid, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 22A) at 11, U.N.

Doc. A/36/22/Add.2 (1982).
80. See G.A. Res. 40/97, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) para. 13, U.N. Doc. A/40/
53 (1985).
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Two problems have arisen under the non-mandatory arms
embargo imposed by the Security Council. The first is the dual
use problem; for example, a helicopter can be used for war or for
peace. The second problem is that some major world powers are
violating the embargo, namely France, Italy, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.8
The United States' violation of the embargo and its voting
pattern on the Security Council have not been progressive. The
U.S. has voted in the United Nations, often alone, against efforts to
end apartheid. The United States takes this position for three reasons. First, it is concerned that a new government in South Africa
will be less friendly to U.S. interests. The U.S. is particularly concerned about a Marxist or pro-Soviet government take-over. Second, the U.S. wants to preserve its access to raw materials in South
Africa, including manganese, platinum-related minerals, gold,
diamonds, and chromium.8 2 Third, the United States government
has traditionally sought to protect U.S. companies doing business
in South Africa, including the plants and assets of those
83
companies.
In February 1986, the Security Council condemned South Africa for recent threats and acts of aggression against other states in
southern Africa.84 The Resolution demanded an end to the state
of emergency in South Africa and an end to apartheid. In voting
on the Resolution, thirteen members of the Security Council voted
in favor, none against, with the United States and the United
85
Kingdom abstaining.
2.

The General Assembly.

The General Assembly has taken numerous other actions
against apartheid. In the General Assembly, the voice of the U.K.
and the U.S. is proportionally less than in the Security Council,
while the voice of the Third World is much stronger. Perhaps it is
81. See World Armaments and Disarmaments,1974 Stockholm Int'l Peace Res.
Inst. Y.B. 281; Assistance, supra note 79, at 4-8.
82. The U.S. imports significant portions of the South African output of anti-

mony, chromite, ferrochromium, ferromaganese, platinum metals, diamonds, and
fluorospar. Africa Hearings,supra note 25, at 496-97.
83. See U.S. Policy Toward South Africa"HearingsBefore the Subcomms. on InternationalEconomic Policy and Trade, on Africa, and on InternationalOrganizations of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 477-657 (1980).
84. S.C. Res. 581, 13 U.N. SCOR (2662d mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/581 (1986).
85. Security Council Warns South Africa Against Committing 'Aggression, Ter-

rorism and Destabilization'Against African States, UN Monthly Chron., Apr. 1986,
at 36.
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for this reason that the General Assembly has voted early and
often against apartheid.
The question of apartheidwas raised at the General Assembly's first session in 1946. India complained about the treatment of
people of Indian origin in South Africa. In Resolution 395 (1950),
the General Assembly found that apartheidwas necessarily a policy of racial discrimination within the meaning of the Charter's
prohibition.8 6 The General Assembly therefore ordered the government of South Africa to suspend implementation of the infamous "Group Areas Act."8 7 In Resolution 616A (VII) (1952),88 the
General Assembly formally condemned apartheid and established
a commission of three members to monitor the situation in South
Africa.8 9 Resolution 1761 (XVII) (1962) requested member states
to sever all diplomatic and trade relations with South Africa.90 In
1974, the General Assembly rejected the credentials of the South
African delegation. 91 South Africa was no longer permitted to
vote. Because of Security Council inaction, however, South Africa
92
was not technically expelled from the United Nations.
From the viewpoint of placing pressure on the South African
government, probably the most effective international action has
been the international sports boycott. 93 The international boycott
against athletic competition either against South African teams or
in South Africa has really brought home the world's abhorrence of
86. G.A. Res. 395 (V), 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20), at 24, U.N. Doc. A/1775
(1950).
87. Group Areas Act, No. 41 of 1950, as amended by Act No. 65 of 1952 &
amending Acts of 1955, cited in Henry May, The South African Constitution 506
n.13 (1955). See also Consolidated Acts, No. 77 of 1957 & No. 36 of 1966, cited in
Muriel Harrell, Laws Affecting Race Relations in South Africa: 1948-1976, at 71
(1978). The goal of the Act was to divide towns and districts into separate areas for
the different racial groups. May, supra,at 506.
88. G.A. Res. 616 A (VII), 7 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) 'at 8, U.N. Doc. A/2361
(1952).
89. See Reports of the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in
the Union of South Africa, 10 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14), U.N. Doc. A/2953 (1955);
9 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/2719 (1954); 8 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
16), U.N. Docs. A/2505 & A/2505/Add.1 (1953).
90. G.A. Res. 1761 (XVII), 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 9-10, U.N. Doc. A/
5217 (1963).
91. G.A. Res. 3207 (XXIX) (1974), summarized in Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization,16 June 1974 - 15 June 1975, 30 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 1) at 33-34, U.N. Doc. A/10001 (1975). See also Alden Abbott, Filiberto
Augusti, Peter Brown & Elizabeth Rode, The General Assembly, 29th Session: The
Decredentialization of South Africa,. 16 Harv. Int'l L.J. 576 (1975) [hereinafter
Decredentialization].
92. Decredentialization,supra note 91, at 577.
93. See Centre Against Apartheid, UN Dep't of Political & Security Council Affairs, Register of Sports Contacts with South Africa, Notes & Documents, Dec. 1982,
at i.
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apartheidto the average white South African. Since many South
African whites are avid sports enthusiasts, the sports boycott,
which has been quite well enforced, has been a useful international measure. Most recently, the General Assembly has been
considering an international Convention Against Apartheid in
Sports, which will give further legal support to the General As94
sembly's initial actions establishing the sports boycott.
Incidentally, the United States's policy of "constructive engagement" 95 with South Africa has not gone unnoticed in the General Assembly. On December 10, 1985, the General Assembly
condemned "the policies of 'constructive engagement' and active
collaboration with the apartheid r6gime followed by the Governments of certain Western and other States which give encouragement to the racist r~gime in its repression of the people's
96
legitimate struggle."
3.

Other UN Bodies.

Other UN bodies have also taken action against South Africa.
For example, the Commission on Human Rights in 1967 established an ad hoc working group of experts to investigate charges of
violations such as arbitrary killings and torture in South Africa. 97
The working group issues major factual reports following its investigations. 98 These investigations can be an effective means of protecting human rights. As the Montreal Statement of the Assembly
for Human Rights correctly observed, "[t]he mere existence of an
official and impartial fact-finding body might deter violations of
human rights." 99
94. See Sanctions Against South Africa: A Selective Bibliography at 11-12, U.N.
Doc. ST/LIB/SER.B/32, U.N. Sales No. E/F.81.I.13 (1981).
95. "Constructive engagement" is the Reagan Administration's term for a policy toward South Africa that is less confrontational than a policy that includes sanctions. Constructive engagement is based on the philosophy that continued U.S.
economic interests in South Africa could subtly affect apartheid. Reagan's view is
that constructive engagement is more effective than sanctions, as it continues U.S.
involvement in South Africa, rather than abandon that country to its internal politics. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1981, at 11, col. 1; id., May 23, 1981, at 7, col. 1.
96. G.A. Res. 40/64 A, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/40/53
(1985). See also Calls for Comprehensive Sanctions against South Africa Made by
Assembly, UN Monthly Chron., Number 10/11 1984, at 16, 17.
97. Commission on Human Rights Res. 2 (XXIII), 42 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No.
6) at 76-78, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/940 (1967).
98. See, e.g., Violations of Human Rights in Southern Africa: Report of the Ad
Hoc Working Group of Experts, 41 ESCOR (Agenda Item 6) at 1, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/1985/14 (1985); see also Hernhn Santa Cruz, Racial Discriminationat 148-213,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/307/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.71.XIV.2 (1971).
99. John Carey, UN Protection of Civil and Political Rights 84 (1970) (quoting
the Montreal Assembly for Human Rights). Some helpful fact-finding has been
done in South Africa. See, e.g., Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of the
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The Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination
and the Protection of Minorities has also played an investigatory
role. Its Special Rapporteur, Ahmad Khalifa, has ambitiously compiled a list of banks and firms who have helped South Africa's
economy.' 0 0 The Sub-Commission has also made direct appeals on
behalf of individuals, such as Nelson Mandela.101 It called upon
the government of South Africa to conduct a meaningful investigation into the true cause of the death of Stephen Biko.102 In 1985,
the Sub-Commission decided to open all future sessions with a moment of silence to demonstrate solidarity with the victims of
03
apartheid.l
The 1985 World Conference on the United Nations Decade
for Women also called for economic sanctions against South Africa.104 Only the U.S., represented by Maureen Reagan, voted
"no." The non-governmental organizations forum of that conference conducted numerous workshops on the status of women
under apartheid.
The UN Commission on Transnational Corporations monitors
the effects of corporate policies, particularly in the Third World.
In 1985, the Commission issued a report criticizing voluntary corporate codes such as the Sullivan Principles for not helping the
Witwatersrand, Report on the Rabie Report: An Examination of Security Legislation in South Africa (1982).
100. The Adverse Consequencesfor the Enjoyment of Human Rights of Political,
Military, Economic and Other Forms of Assistance Given to the Colonial and Racist Regime in South Africa, 38 U.N. ESCOR (Agenda Item 5(b)) at 10-21, U.N.
Docs. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/8 & Add. 1-2 (1985); 37 U.N. ESCOR (Agenda Item 5(b))
at 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1984/8/Rev.1 (1984); 32 U.N. ESCOR Annex 1
(Agenda Item 5) at 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/425 (1979); Assistance, supra note
79, at 8-17; see also Transnational Corporationsin South Africa and Namibia, 11
U.N. ESCOR Annex 1 (Agenda Item 6(a)) at 13, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/1985/7 (1985).
101. Nelson Mandela is the head of the African National Congress who is serving a sentence of life imprisonment under maximum security at Pollsmoor prison
near Cape Town. Violations of Human Rights in Southern Africa, 40 U.N. ESCOR
(Agenda Item 6) at 27, 37, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/8 (1984).
102. Stephen Biko was the leader of South Africa's Black Consciousness Movement. He was arrested on August 18, 1977, and died in a Port Elizabeth prison on
September 12, 1977, as a result of brain injury inflicted by one or more members of
the South African Security Police Force. See Louis Pollak, The Inquest into the
Death of Stephen Barty Biko: A Report to the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
under Law 3, 7, 29 (Feb. 24, 1978) (unpublished report on file with Law &
Inequality).
103. 38 U.N. ESCOR (37th mtg.) at 122, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/57 (1985).
104. Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements
of the United Nations Decadefor Women: Equality, Development and Peace at 6062, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.116/28/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.85.IV.10 (1986); see also Report of the World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discriminationat 99,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.92/40, U.N. Sales No. E.79.XIV.2 (1979).
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Black majority in a meaningful way. 105 This report should provoke controversy and critical self-examination within the corporate community. The report takes the general view that economic
and military support for South Africa accrues to the white minority-not to the Black majority.106 Nevertheless, such support for
South Africa is frequently labeled as being "good" for Blacks. Perhaps, one must ask: to whom shall we listen? To those who have
an obvious stake in the status quo or to members of the Black
majority?
4.

The Declaration on Colonialism.

While the struggle in South Africa is against racism, it is also
against colonialism. The white minority's presence and power in
South Africa certainly is a colonial phenomenon. The policy of restricting Blacks to the so-called "homelands" is a colonial practice.107 It was this kind of group-based oppression that the
General Assembly addressed when, in 1960, it passed Resolution
1514(XV): Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial
countries and peoples. 10s "Recognizing the passionate yearning for
freedom in all dependent peoples... in the attainment of their independence" and "[b]elieving that the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible and that, in order to avoid serious crises,
an end must be put to colonialism and all practices of segregation
and discrimination associated therewith," the General Assembly
declared that "[t]he subjection of peoples to alien subjugation,
domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental
human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and
is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation."10 9 Accordingly, liberation movements in South Africa are eligible for some of the trust fund assistance mentioned earlier in
regard to Namibia.
C. Recent Developments in United States Policy
The changes in United States policy toward the government
of South Africa made in the summer and autumn of 1986 will no
105. Examination of the Activities of TransnationalCorporationsin South Africa and Namibia, U.N. ESCOR (Agenda Item 3) at 10, 12-14, 20-21, U.N. Doc. E/
C.10/AC.4/1985/5 (1985).
106. Id. at 10.
107. See Apartheid: The International Legal Implications 1-2 (Millard Arnold ed.
1978).
108. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66-67, U.N. Doc. A/
4684 (1961). See also Highlights of Efforts, supra note 19, app. I at 43-44, for the
text of the resolution.
109. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 108.
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doubt be discussed for some time. Only time will tell whether
those changes were mostly symbolic or substantive, whether they
were wise or foolish, whether they went too far or were too little
too late.
The United States Senate and House of Representatives
voted to override President Reagan's veto and impose economic
sanctions against South Africa. These sanctions prevent any new
U.S. investment in or bank loans to South Africa, ban the import
of iron, steel, coal, textiles, uranium, and agricultural products,
place an embargo on oil products, ban all non-emergency landings
and take-offs of South African airliners in the United States, and
create new economic assistance for South African Blacks.1 10
This new United States policy grew out of an increasingly
tense atmosphere about apartheid both in South Africa and in
world opinion. Recent attempts at mediation by Commonwealth
leaders between Black leaders and the South African government
had failed."'1 Amid strikes by Blacks in South Africa and
thousands of arrests by South African police, Pretoria once again
imposed a state of emergency, this time on the tenth anniversary
of the Soweto uprisings.1 12 The government reserved the right to
make warrantless searches, control essential services, close businesses, and censor domestic and foreign press. In response to Pretoria's action, Canada and France talked of supporting trade
sanctions, and Canada revoked the credentials of four South African diplomats.113 At a UN conference, representatives from a hundred nations turned out to hear Rev. Jesse Jackson urge economic
sanctions.11 4 Jackson's talk was boycotted by the United States,
the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany. 1 5
When the UN Security Council attempted to impose economic
sanctions against South Africa for its aggression against Angola,
the resolution was vetoed by the United States and the United
Kingdom.11s
President Reagan attempted to put more subtle political pressure on Pretoria by using the leverage of congressional pressure to
adopt economic sanctions. 17 Reagan had proposed excepting
South African companies adhering to anti-discrimination princi110. See Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat.
1086; N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1986, at Al, col. 1; id., Oct. 3, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
111. N.Y. Times, June 7, 1986, at Al, col. 4.
112. See id., June 13, 1986, at Al, col. 4; id., June 19, 1986, at Al, col. 4, 5.
113. See id., June 13, 1986, at A13, col. 1; id., June 15, 1986, at A10, col. 5.

114. Id., June 17, 1986, at A10, col. 4.
115. Id
116. Id., June 19, 1986, at A10, col. 3.
117. See id., June 20, 1986, at A10, col. 1.
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ples and compensating United States companies suffering disadvantages in international competition as a result of the
sanctions. 118 Also, Reagan would have banned the import of iron
and steel, but not of coal, textiles, uranium, or agricultural products.119 Perhaps, in hope of avoiding more severe congressional actions, Reagan fulfilled his commitment to name a Black envoy to
South Africa by appointing veteran diplomat Edward J. Perkins to
the post.120 Congress was not satisfied with such measures, however, and easily overrode Reagan's veto of the sanctions bill.121
The issue remains whether these sanctions are more symbolic
than actually punitive. Coal imports from South Africa, now
banned, amounted to $43 million last year. South African coal output, however, totaled $50 billion. 122 In anticipaton of sanctions,
United States business investments in South Africa had already
declined.123 Bank loans were also declining because of a decision
by the American Bank Association opposing further bank loans to
South Africa. Similar measures had also been taken by state and
local governments. Due to this pre-sanction investment decrease,
about two percent of South Africa earnings will be affected by the
federal sanctions.124 Furthermore, because the Anti-Apartheid
Act is meant as a comprehensive statement of U.S. policy towards
South Africa, it may preempt state, county, and municipal actions,
requiring divestment. Therefore, the Anti-Apartheid Act could actually decrease the cumulative economic sanctions against South
Africa. 125 Nevertheless, if Western Europe and Japan increase
118. Id., Sept. 30, 1986, at A6, col. 6.
119. Id.
120. Id., Oct. 1, 1986, at A6, col. 1.
121. Id., Sept. 30, 1986, at Al, col. 1; id., Oct. 3, 1986, at Al, col. 6.

122. Id., Oct. 4, 1986, at Al, col. 5.
123. See id.; id., July 5, 1986, at A4, col. 5; id., June 19, 1986, at Al, col. 4.
124. Id., Oct. 4, 1986, at A3, col. 1.
125. The purpose stated in section 4 of the Act is "to set forth a comprehensive
and complete framework to guide the efforts of the United States in helping to
bring an end to apartheid in South Africa." Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 4, 100 Stat. 1086, 1088. There was considerable debate in
Congress regarding whether this language is meant to indicate a congressional intent to preempt local actions. See generally 132 Cong. Rec. E3104 (daily ed. Sept.
12, 1986) (statement of Rep. Leland) (quoting Los Angeles Times, Sept. 12, 1986, at
115, col. 3). Representative Leland did not view the Act as preemptive. Senators
Kennedy, Proxmire, and Cranston took the same position. Senator Lugar, one of
the main proponents of the Act, however, did consider it as preempting non-federal
action. Id. Although investment decisions are clearly local in nature, that characterization may not save state actions from being preempted. See Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Local actions that affect foreign relations have been found unconstitutional in the past. See, e.g.,
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941);
New York Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 79 Misc. 2d
1046, 362 N.Y.S.2d 321 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974), aff'd, 49 A.D.2d 851, 374 N.Y.S.2d 9
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their own sanctions against South Africa, the cumulative effect of
economic sanctions may be enough to bring about some substantive changes in South African racial policies.
D.

Other Legal Action

There has been international legal action against apartheid,
not only in the United Nations, but also in both United States and
South African tribunals. In New York Times Co. v. City of New
York Commission on Human Rights,126 both the American Committee on Africa and other plaintiffs argued that advertisements
for employment in South African countries constituted discrimination under New York law because Black applicants would not be
considered for those positions. The New York Human Rights
Commission was persuaded by the plaintiffs' argument and ordered the New York Times to cease and desist from publishing ads
for South African positions.127 The New York Supreme Court
overturned the Commission's order on freedom of speech
grounds 128 and later, the Court of Appeals affirmed.129 In the
early 1970's, the New York Times had used great energy and skill
to defend its right to advertize jobs in the South African government and industry for white workers. One wonders whether the
Times would take the same position today. In any case, the Times
case set the stage for other creative uses of United States courts to
bring pressure on the South African government.
In another domestic lawsuit, the American Committee on Africa, the Congressional Black Caucus, and other groups intervened
before the Civil Aeronautics Board (C.A.B.) when the South African Airways applied for a new route permit in the United
States.130 The plaintiffs argued that because the governmentowned airline discriminated against Blacks in employment and
travel facilities, the C.A.B. could not find, as is necessary under
Sections 404(b) and 411 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, that
the proposed route would be "in the public interest."131 Although
the hearing examiner was not persuaded by this argument, and
although then-President Nixon signed the order granting the per(N.Y. App. Div. 1975), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 345, 361 N.E.2d 963, 393 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1977).
Further discussion of this problem is beyond the scope of this article.
126. 41 N.Y.2d at 345, 361 N.E.2d at 963, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
127. Id. at 348, 361 N.E.2d at 965, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
128. 79 Misc. 2d at 1046, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
129. 41 N.Y.2d at 345, 361 N.E.2d at 963, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
130. Diggs v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 516 F.2d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 910 (1976).
131. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1372, 1374(b) (1982).
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mit, the action accomplished two things: (1) before the permit was
granted, South African Airways hired several Black employees for
its United States offices, and (2) the airline discontinued racial dis32
crimination in seating on its flights inside South Africa.
In 1974, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
represented the United Mine Workers in an administrative complaint before the U.S. Commissioner of Customs to stop the impor133
South
tation of South African coal into the United States.
African law in effect at the time compelled indentured labor under
34
penal sanction for all Black workers in the coal industry.1
Blacks constituted the majority of the labor force in South African
mines.
The complaint arose under Section 307 of the Tariff Act of
1930, which prohibits the importation of goods produced or manufactured by forced labor, indentured labor under penal sanctions,
or convict labor, provided that United States consumptive demand
135
for the particular item can be satisfied from domestic sources.
Evidence revealed that the United States could easily satisfy its
demand for coal and was, in fact, a net exporter of
own 1domestic
36
coal.

Although the Customs Service was not ultimately persuaded
by the plaintiffs' argument, the filing of the complaint had direct
consequences: the South African Parliament repealed forty-one
.laws and sections of laws imposing criminal sanctions for the violation of labor contracts in mining, manufacturing, and other sectors
of its economy.137 Indeed, the repeal of those laws strengthened
the efforts to establish Black trade unions in South Africa. Those
Black unions-particularly in the mining industry-today represent one of the most significant independent political forces
against racial oppression in South Africa. Hence, the legal action in
the United States indirectly led to significant pressures against
apartheid.
These three cases show that creative U.S. lawyers can bring
about changes in South Africa even if their actions do not prevail
132. Douglas Wachholz, International Legal Assistance and the Utilization of
Domestic Legal Techniques in Support of Human Rights in Southern Africa: Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law 14 (1975) (unpublished manuscript on
file with Law & Inequality).
133. Douglas Wachholz, The Utilization of Domestic Legal Techniques to Give
Effect to U.N. Anti-Racist Measures, in Africa Legal Assistance Project, Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, attachment II at 3 (1974).
134. Id.
135. 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1982).
136. Wachholz, supra note 132, at 17.
137. Id. at 18.
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in U.S. courts and tribunals. 3 8 These cases also show that to bring
about more direct change, lawyers and would-be policy makers
must go to the legislatures and to international legal fora. Indeed,
measures for divestment have been adopted or are under consideration in the U.S. Congress, state legislatures, city councils, and uni39
versities throughout the United States.1
U.S. lawyers have also helped South African lawyers working
in the South African courts trying to secure the rights of those
whom the South African government would like to silence. In
South Africa, anti-apartheid speech or political activity is a
crime. 140 Persons have been imprisoned, tortured, and arbitrarily
killed for attending or organizing peaceful demonstrations or
funerals.141

South African lawyers who represent such activists are by no
means immune from arbitrary arrests and killings. For example,
South African civil rights attorney Victoria Mxenge was killed
outside her home, allegedly by government security forces. 1 42 She
was killed just weeks before she was to represent twelve United
Democratic Front activists who were charged with treason.
In spite of the repressive nature of South Africa's government, competent, well-funded lawyers can make a difference in
ensuring a degree of due process for the accused. In August 1986,
the American Bar Association protested the arrests of South African lawyers who were defending Black minority members against
state charges.' 4 3 United States lawyers, individually and collec138. Timothy Smith, The Role of ConcernedShareholders: The Proxy Resolution
and Other ShareholderAction, in International Human Rights, supra note 4, at 143,

148.
139. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,535, 50 Fed. Reg. 40,325 (1985) (prohibition of
importation of Krugerrands); Minneapolis, Minn., Resolution 85R-44 (Nov. 21,

1985); Minnesota State Board of Investment, Resolution (Oct. 2, 1985); Bureau of
Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, South Africa: Presidential Actions, Current

Pol'y No. 735, Sept. 9, 1985 (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,532, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,861
(1985)); Jennifer Davis, James Cason & Gail Hovey, Economic Disengagement and

South Africa. The Effectiveness and Feasibilityof Implementing Sanctions and Divestment, 15 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 529 (1983); Letter from University of Minnesota
President Kenneth Keller to the University of Minnesota Board of Regents, Sept. 5,
1985, reprinted in Minn. Minority Lawyers Ass'n, Apartheid and American Lawyers (1985) [hereinafter American Lawyers].
140. See Amnesty International, Political Imprisonment in South Africa 18-36
(1978) [hereinafter Political Imprisonment]; see also Oral Statement by Amnesty
International to the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Situation of Human Rights in South Africa (Aug. 9, 1985)
[hereinafter Situation of Human Rights], reprinted in American Lawyers, supra
note 139.
141. See generally Political Imprisonment, supra note 140.
142. Situation of Human Rights, supra note 140.

143. N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1986, at A3, col. 3.
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tively, have provided invaluable assistance to local counsel in
South Africa by directing funding where it is required, offering
legal assistance when it is requested, and observing trials and inquests where public attention may be beneficial. Lawyers' organizations which have worked in these ways to help South African
lawyers include the American Bar Association, Amnesty International legal groups, the International Commission of Jurists, the
International Defence and Aid Fund, the International Human
Rights Law Group, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee, and the
4
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund.14
Conclusion
United States policies toward South Africa have long been
short-sighted. Perhaps 1986 will be remembered as the year the
United States began a significant change in its response to
apartheid. The question remains: What should United States lawyers do about apartheid? In this regard, Robert McNamara's statement of 1982 has the ring of prophesy:
The most underrated danger of human events is prolonged
procrastination. And the greatest tragedies of history have occurred, not so much because of what was finally done, but because of what had earlier foolishly been left undone. In the
matter at hand, to fail to act145wisely now is only to ensure having to act desperately later.
Perhaps, if lawyers and others act promptly and in good faith, it is
not too late.
144. See David Abramowitz, Safeguarding Due Process in a Hostile Environment: Foreign Lawyers in South Africa, in Issues of Transnational Legal Practice,

1985 Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud. 253, 253 n.1.
145. Robert McNamara, Chancellor's Lecture, University of Witwatersrand, Oct.
21, 1982, quoted in University of Minnesota Advisory Committee on South Africa,

Report to President Keller 29 (June 5, 1985).

